Compliance FrameworksInternal
Typosquatting Detection
Detects known typosquatted package names: potential supply chain confusion attacks.
Detects known typosquatted package names: potential supply chain confusion attacks.
| Short name | Typosquatting |
| Region | Internal |
| Country or scope | Internal |
| Sector | Supply Chain |
| In your workspace | On unless you switch it off in Compliance โบ Manage. |
How Safeguard covers Typosquatting
- Scan requirements: 6, all decided by a scan.
- Controls: the scan requirements below, plus 7 controls from Safeguard's control catalog for Typosquatting.
- Automated tests: none map to it directly. You can link any automated test to its controls yourself (how).
- Policy templates: 25: 3 written for Typosquatting and 22 from the standard set.
How each kind of coverage works, and what the readiness score counts: Compliance frameworks.
What a scan checks
Each scan of a product checks these 6 requirements against what the scan found, including the product's software inventory (SBOM).
| Requirement | What Safeguard checks | Decided by |
|---|---|---|
TYPO-PURL Exact Ecosystem Identity | Detecting look-alike package names requires each component to carry a Package URL fixing its ecosystem, namespace, and exact name (PURL specification; OpenSSF package name-confusion guidance) | Scan |
TYPO-COMPLETE Name and Version Present | Name-similarity analysis against known-good registries requires every component record to contain both a name and a version (CISA open source software security guidance on dependency hygiene) | Scan |
TYPO-PIN Pinned Versions | Dependency-confusion attacks exploit floating version ranges that let a higher-versioned malicious package win resolution; versions must be exact, not ranges or 'latest' (OpenSSF / industry dependency-confusion guidance, e.g. namespace substitution attacks) | Scan |
TYPO-HASH Artifact Hash Comparison | Confirming a suspect package is the legitimate upstream artifact requires integrity hashes to compare against registry-published digests (OpenSSF supply chain integrity guidance) | Scan |
TYPO-SUP Supplier Attribution | Typosquatted packages typically have suppliers that differ from the legitimate project's maintainer; supplier data per component enables this comparison (OpenSSF package provenance guidance) | Scan |
TYPO-GRAPH Introduction Path Traceability | When a suspicious package is found, the dependency graph is needed to trace which direct dependency introduced it (CISA SBOM guidance: dependency relationships) | Scan |
More controls in the catalog
The framework's Controls tab lists its scan requirements and these controls from Safeguard's control catalog. Evidence them with automated tests, uploaded evidence, policies or an attestation.
| Control | Name |
|---|---|
TS-01 | Package-Name Edit Distance Check |
TS-02 | Known Typosquat Catalog Correlation |
TS-03 | Install-Block Policy for Unreviewed Packages |
TS-04 | Scope and Namespace Squatting Detection |
TS-05 | Homoglyph and Unicode Attack Detection |
TS-06 | New Package Age Verification |
TS-07 | Allowlist Governance and Review Cadence |
Policy templates
Written for Typosquatting:
- Typosquatting and Malicious Package Detection Policy
- Package Allowlist Governance and Install-Block Policy
- Dependency Confusion and Internal Registry Security Policy
And 22 from the standard set, adapted to Typosquatting.